As elsewhere in India too ownership matters - that the corporate owners of mass communications media do actually use it (both consciously and unconsciously) for their own purposes, which are domination and control. Conversely, one of the great triumphs of neoliberal ideology has been to convince so many of us that it does not matter, that the media are ideologically neutral and above social conflict, and that the concentration of media ownership in a few private hands is natural, inevitable and perhaps even beneficial. Anyone who has any doubts about this matter should read Schiller's books.
Mass Communication students and researchers in India must reflect on the writings of Herbert Irving Schiller, an American media critic, sociologist, author, and scholar. Schiller warned of two major trends in his prolific writings and speeches: the private takeover of public space and public institutions at home, and U.S. corporate domination of cultural life abroad, especially in the developing nations. His eight books and hundreds of articles in both scholarly and popular journals made him a key figure both in communication research and in the public debate over the role of the media in modern society.
His Books
* Mind Managers (1972).
* Mass Communications and American Empire
* The Ideology of International Communications (Monograph Series / Institute for Media Analysis, Inc, No. 4)
* Mass Communications and American Empire (Critical Studies in Communication and in the Cultural Industries)
* Super-state; readings in the military-industrial complex
* Communication and Cultural Domination (1976)
* Living in the Number One Country : Reflections from a Critic of American Empire
* Who Knows : Information in the Age of the Fortune 500 (1981)
* Information and the Crisis Economy (1984)
* Culture, Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression (1989)
* Information Inequality: The Deepening Social Crisis in America (1996)
His first book, Mass Communications and American Empire, was published in 1969. He taught "Political Economy of Communications" and he presented his first paper in the communications field, on the topic of the radio spectrum considered as a natural resource.
Post World War II, US corporations to flourish in a condition of formal political subordination (colonialism) to one of political independence combined with economic dependence (postcolonialism) with "a marriage of economics and electronics" backed up by an extremely formidable military power; U.S. bases encircle the globe, ready and willing to use force when more sophisticated methods of persuasion fail.
His book "Mass Communications and American Empire" called for "a democratic reconstruction of mass communications."
Schiller's second book, "The Mind Managers," published in 1973, showed the specific methods of mind manipulation used by the managers of U.S. communications media in the service of corporate interests.
He identified five basic myths
The "myth of individualism and personal choice" defines freedom in purely individualistic terms and insists that individual liberty and well- being cannot be achieved without the existence of private property in the means of production.
The "myth of neutrality" fosters the belief that key social institutions such as government, the education system and the scientific establishment (and of course the information media themselves) are neutral and above conflicting social interests.
The "myth of unchanging human nature" keeps expectations low by emphasizing the aggressive and depraved sides of human behavior and rationalizing these as inherent and inevitable aspects of the human condition.
The "myth of the absence of social conflict" presents conflict almost invariably as an individual matter, and denies its origins in the social order.
The "myth of media pluralism" perpetuates the illusion of choice and diversity in information sources, when in fact there is little variety of opinion due to the common material and ideological interests of media owners.
Schiller also described two techniques used by media managers to shape consciousness.
The first of these, fragmentation, is the dominant format for the communication of news information in the U.S.: newspapers and magazines intentionally break up articles so that readers are forced to turn past advertisements to continue reading, while television and radio news programs are characterized by "the machine-gun-like recitation of numerous unrelated items," with frequent commercial interruptions.
Advertising,"disrupts concentration and renders trivial the information it interrupts,"
The second technique, immediacy, further undermines the public's understanding of news events; the competitive pressure to provide instantaneous information, Schiller argued, generates a "false sense of urgency," with the result that "the ability to discriminate between different degrees of significance is impaired".
He found reasons for hope that "the industrial working class, young and old, may be compelled for its own protection to abandon its present support for the 'system' and to adopt a vigorously critical stance would help to "demystify the media for a significant number of people".
In 1976, publication of "Communications and Cultural Domination" included an analysis of the media system in Chile under the Allende Popular Unity government overthrown in September 1973 by a military coup, which, it might be noted, was motivated rather explicitly by neoliberal theories of free-market competition as formulated by economists trained at the University of Chicago. In this analysis Schiller noted that, while freedom of information effectively disappeared in Chile after the coup, under the socialist Allende government there was a remarkably free flow of information representing all points on the political spectrum. The largest number of television viewers continued to watch a commercial station that carried programs produced in the U.S. Most radio stations remained in the hands of conservative, antigovernment elements, and the number of conservative newspapers actually increased. Of course, socialist ideas were also disseminated more widely than before, and in Schiller's view this explained the hostility of the anti- Allende elements toward the free information flow that prevailed in 1971-73. The Chilean experience, he argued, showed that genuine pluralism becomes intolerable to property-owning classes when it leads to widespread critical thinking and social action, and he drew the conclusion that the Popular Unity government's strong adherence to the doctrine of the free flow of information was in fact a mistake.
He argued that the flow of information between countries "follows the international division of labor, which itself is determined by the structure and practices of the strongest capitalist states".
He insisted on the legitimate right of nation-states to resist the importation of "messages of domination" in media produced by multinational corporations. It might be better to focus on the teaching of media literacy as part of these efforts, so that members of oppressed groups could learn to recognize and resist "messages of domination" themselves.
In the 1980s, as computerization of the economy and communications accelerated, Schiller advocated a "go-slow" computerization policy. In Who Knows: Information in the Age of the Fortune 500, he called for "a maximum effort directed at slowing down, and postponing wherever possible, the rush to computerization," in order to allow "time to think through the enormous complexities that surround advanced communication and other technologies at this stage of unequal global power and influence".
In Information and the Crisis Economy (1984), he described the "deepening overall social crisis" brought about by "economic, political, and military policies designed to maintain imperial power," and warned that "Technological solutions devoid of social accountability will be terribly costly to millions of human beings".
In Culture, Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression (1989), Schiller lamented that "Transforming information into a salable good, available only to those with the ability to pay for it, changes the goal of information access from an egalitarian to a privileged condition," with the result that "the essential underpinning of a democratic order is seriously, if not fatally, damaged, not only in news but also in entertainment and general cultural product".
In Information Inequality: The Deepening Social Crisis in America (1996), he harshly criticizes the Clinton Adminstration's "vision of, and reliance on, high-tech communications as the ultimate answer to whatever is ailing the country." He dissects the 1993 "Agenda for Action" report issued by the task force on the National Information Infrastructure (NII), calling its promised solutions to the nation's education problems a "technological subterfuge" of the Clinton-Gore leadership and their bipartisan supporters in Congress as "all power to the corporate communication sector," Schiller argues that private ownership and market competition are "Washington's basic prescriptions for the infrastructure that promises to carry, for business and home use, all the image and message and data flow that the country produces".
Sunday, November 4, 2007
Monday, October 15, 2007
Visiting Afghanistan
Afghanistan's present cabinet consists of 25 ministers and one senior minister. Each was nominated by President Hamid Karzai, approved by the Wolesi Jirga (House of People), and sworn in by the President on May 2, 2006.
Prior to Karzai, Burhanuddin Rabbani served as President in the year 2000 since his government was recognized by the United Nations.
In his earlier stint from 1992-1996 until Rabbani was forced to leave Kabul because of the Taliban, Sunni Islamic Nationalists takeover of the city at the behest of Mullah Mohammed Omar Afghanistan's de facto head of state from 1996 to 2001. 
Rabbani fell out of favor with his former allies, the Taliban. However, supported by an organization that became known as the Northern Alliance, Rabbani continued to resist the new Afghan government, and the civil war continued with the help of Ahmad Shah Masud called the "Lion of Panjshir", and then top military chief of the anti-taliban UINFSA (1997-2001), also called Northern Alliance; since 1997 minister of Defence of the Government of the Islamic State internationally recognized who died on 15 September 2001 from his wounds sustained in an assassination atempt suffered on 9 September. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Rabbani agreed to cooperate with American and NATO forces to remove the Taliban from power. With help from coalition troops, Kabul was soon captured and Rabbani became the first president. He was reinstalled in Kabul claiming to be the provisional president on 17 Nov 2001. Soon after, he relinquished control to Hamid Karzai and he is now heading the Jamiat-e Islami party of Afghanistan.
Under the current constitution of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah has been honorfied as the Father of the Nation. Earlier, he came to the throne at the age of 19, after the assassination of his father in November 1933, having previously served as a Cabinet minister. For a number of years Shah remained in the background while his uncle Shah Mahmood Khan ran the government, but he asserted his power through the constitution of 1964, which established a constitutional monarchy and prohibited royal relatives from holding public office.
Shah undertook a number of economic-development projects, including irrigation and highway construction, backed by foreign aid, largely from the United States and the Soviet Union. He was also able to maintain Afghanistan's neutral position in international politics. His reforms seemed to have little effect outside the Kabul area, however. In the early 1970s the country suffered drought and famine. Pashto tribes along the Pakistan border continued to press for autonomy, and the political structure in the capital was unable to deal with the country's economic problems. In a bloodless coup on July 17, 1973, Zahir Shah was deposed. The leader of the coup, Mohammad Daud Khan (the king's brother-in-law), proclaimed Afghanistan a republic with himself as its president.
Daud Khan overthrew the monarchy of Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1973 to establish Afghanistan as a republic. He served as the country's president from 1973 to 1978. He was overthrown and assassinated in the coup ("Saur Revolution") staged by the military and the Communist Party on 27 April 1978.
After Daud Khan, Nur Mohammad Taraki served as the President of the Democratic Republic and of the Revolutionary Council from 30 April 1978 to 16 September 1979. He was arrested on 16 September 1979 and executed shortly after by order of Hafizullah Amin who took over as President of the Democratic Republic and of the Revolutionary Council from 16 September to 27 December 1979. He was also overthrown and killed by the Soviet Army on 27 Dec 1979.
Babrak Karmal took over as the President of the Democratic Republic and of the Revolutionary Council from 27 December 1979 to 20 November 1986; He was removed from power at the Soviet request. He died on 3 December 1996 in Moscow . Mohammad Najibullah took over as President of the Republic from 30 September 1987 to 16 April 1992 . In May, 1996 a theology professor at Kabul University, a Tajik, Burhanuddin Rabbani, became president.
Among his first decrees was to mandate the wearing of the burqa by Kabul's relatively well-educated and sophisticated women, and to ban women newscasters from television. The U.S. recognized his government, maintaining cordial relations while soon detaching itself from the situation it had produced. The Soviet Union withdrew in 1989, but continued to provide military assistance worth billions of dollars to the PDPA regime until the USSR's collapse in 1991. The Mujahideen established a new government in Kabul led by Sebghatullah Mujaddeddi. But the Mujahideen were soon torn by factional struggles, particularly between Massoud's group and the Fundamentalist party of Hekmatyar. In the wake of Mujahedeen brutalities in the country the Taliban forces took Kabul in 1996. Najibullah who had taken refuge in the UN compound was captured castrated and hanged after he was handed over by his own intelligence chief, Rashid Dostum executed by the Taliban on 27 September 1996.
Najibullah had been living there under UN protection for four and a half years, since his government fell in 1992. The hapless pair of Najibullah and his brother were hanged from a traffic control box after their bodies were bloodied, tortured and mutilated bodies.
Currently President Karzai has appointed his 2 vice presidents and his ministers.
First Vice President Ahmad Zia Masood
Second Vice President Mohammad Karim Khalili
Senior Minister in the Cabinet
H.E. Hedayat Amin Arsala
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta
Minister of National Defense
H.E. General Abdul Rahim Wardak
Ministry of Interior Affairs
H.E. Zarar Ahmad Moqbel
Ministry of Finance
H.E. Dr. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi
Ministry of Economy
H.E. Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams
Ministry of Justice
H.E. Sarwar Danish
Ministry of Culture and Youth
Affairs
H.E. Abdul Karim Khoram
Ministry of Education
H.E. DR. Mohamad Hanif Atmar
Ministry of Higher Education
H.E. Dr. Ahzam Dadfar
Ministry of Commerce
H. E. Dr. Mohammad Amin Farhang
Ministry of Water & Energy
H.E. Mohammad Ismail Khan
Minister of Transportand Aviation
H.E. Eng. Nehmatullah Ehsan Jawid
Ministry of Women Affairs
H.E. Mrs. Hosn Bano Ghazanfar
Ministry of Hajj and Islamic Affairs
H.E. Nehmatullah Shahrani
Minister of Public Welfare
H.E. Sohrab Ali Saffary
Minister of Public Health
H.E. Dr. Mohammad Amin Fatimie
Minister of Agriculture
H.E. Obaidullah Ramin M
Ministry of Mines
H.E. Ibrahim Adel
Ministry of Communication
H.E. Eng. Amirzai Sangin
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
H.E. Ehsan Zia
Ministry of Work, Social Affairs, Martyred, and Disabled
H.E. Noor Mohammad Qarqeen
Ministry of Borders & Tribal Affairs
H.E. Karim Barahowie
Ministry of Urban Development
H.E. Engineer Yousef Pashtun
Ministry of Anti-Narcotics
H.E. Habibullah Qaderi
Ministry of Refugees
H.E. Mohammad Akbar
Heads of State of Afghanistan since 1919
Emirate of Afghanistan: Amanullah Khan | Inayatullah Khan | Habibullah Ghazi
Kingdom of Afghanistan: Mohammed Nadir Shah | Mohammed Zahir Shah
Daoud's Republic of Afghanistan: Mohammed Daoud Khan
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: Nur Muhammad Taraki | Hafizullah Amin | Babrak Karmal | Haji Mohammad Chamkani | Mohammad Najibullah
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Sibghatullah Mojaddedi | Burhanuddin Rabbani
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Mohammed Omar
Afghanistan Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Burhanuddin Rabbani (Northern Alliance)| Hamid Karzai
A Brief History of Afghanistan: By Adam Ritscher
This was delivered as a speech at a Students Against War teach-in in Duluth, Minnesota (USA)
The story of Afghanistan is in so many ways a very tragic one. Afghanistan is one of the most impoverished nations of the world. It is one of the most war-torn, most ravaged, and most beleaguered of nations. It is a nation that has been beset by invasion, external pressure and internal upheaval since before the time of Alexander the Great. Its people are a people who have endured more than most of us can ever imagine. In fact, for many Afghanis, all that has changed in the last one thousand years are the weapons which have been used against so many of them. It is therefore with great sadness and respect that I tell the story of Afghanistan.
First of all, who are the Afghanis? Afghanistan has historically been the link between Central Asia, the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent. It is therefore a nation made up of many different nationalities – the result of innumerable invasions and migrations. Within its current borders there are at least a dozen major ethnic groups – Baluch, Chahar Aimak, Turkmen, Hazara, Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Nuristani, Arab, Kirghiz, Pashai and Persian.
Historically the Pashtun nationality has been the most dominant. The term Afghan, for example, generally is viewed by other peoples in the country to refer to the Pashtuns. The royal families of the country were Pashtun, and today the Pashtun represent about 50% of the total population. Tajiks come in second with 25%, and the rest make up considerably smaller percentages.
Within the country there are tiny Hindu, Sikh and Jewish communities, but the vast majority of this people are Muslims – and in fact many ethnic groups consider Islam to be one of the defining aspects of their ethnic identity. This is true of the Pashtun for example.
Islam was brought to Afghanistan during the eight and ninth century by the Arabs. Prior to that the nation had been ruled by various Persian, Greek, Sassasian and Central Asian empires. Following a subsequent break down in Arab rule, semi-independent states began to form. These local dynasties and states however were overwhelmed and crushed during the Mongolian invasions of the 1200s – conquerors who were to remain in control of part or all of the country until the 1500s, despite much resistance and internal strife. Following the collapse of Mongol rule, Afghanistan found itself in a situation much like what has continued into modern times – caught between the vice of two great powers. During this time it was the Mughals of northern India and the Safavids of Iran that fought over the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan. Armies marched to and fro devastating the land and murdering the people, laying siege to city after city, and destroying whatever had been left by the invading army that preceded it.
It was not until 1747 that Afghanistan was able to free itself. This was the year that Nadir Shah, an empire builder from Iran, died and left a vacuum in central Asia that a former Afghan bodyguard, named Ahmed Shah, was able to fill. Ahmad was a Pashtun, and his Pashtun clan was to rule Afghanistan, in one form or another, for the next 200 years.
Ahmad was able to unify the different Afghan tribes, and went on to conquer considerable parts of what are today eastern Iran, Pakistan, northern India and Uzbekistan. His successors though proved unable to hold his vast empire together, and within 50 years much of it had been seized by rival regional powers. Within the country there were numerous bloody civil wars for the throne, and for many Afghanis it meant little that their lives were now being uprooted and destroyed by ethnic kin, as opposed to foreign invaders.
Beginning in the 1800s Afghanistan’s internal affairs became dramatically aggravated by the increasing intervention by two new imperialist powers – the British Empire and Czarist Russia. The British were expanding and consolidating their colonial holdings on the India sub-continent, and were looking at the Hindu Kush mountains of Afghanistan as a natural barrier to prevent invasion by rival imperialists. The Russians, for their part, were expanding south and east, swallowing up several formerly independent sultanates and emirates in Central Asia. The two great powers essentially engaged in a race for Afghanistan, and their fiendish seizures of land, overthrow of indigenous nations and reckless interference into the affairs of the remaining independent states in the region became known as “the Great Game.”
Imperialists often give such trivial, and even humorous, sounding names to their interventionist schemes, but don’t be fooled into thinking that the peoples of the region experienced the consequences of these actions in a manner that they in any way would have interpreted as a game. For them the consequences were devastating. The arrival of European imperialism into the region simply accelerated, and made more devastating, the wars, poverty and material destruction that had already wracked the region.
During this time, on two separate occasions, British armies from India outright invaded Afghanistan in attempts to install puppet governments amenable to British economic interests, and that would oppose the economic interests of Czarist Russia.
The first, which became known as the First Anglo-Afghan War, took place in 1838. Outraged by the presence of a single Russian diplomat in Kabul, the British demanded that Afghanistan shun any contact with Russia or Iran, and that it hand over vast tracts of Pashtun inhabited land to British India (regions that are today party of Pakistan). Dost Mohammad, the Afghan ruler, agreed to these humiliating demands, but the British still invaded the country. The British seized most of the major cities in Afghanistan with little resistance, but their heavy handed rule soon resulted in a popular uprising by the people which resulted in the massacre of the entire British army of 15,000, save one.
British outrage over the uninvited arrival of a Russian diplomatic envoy in Kabul in 1878 resulted in the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Again the British were able to occupy all of the major cities, but unlike the last time, the British got wind of an impending rebellion against their occupation, and brutally crushed it in a pre-emptive move. They did subsequently withdraw, but not before they set up a puppet ruler and forced the country to hand over control of its foreign affairs to Britain.
Afghanistan would remain a British protectorate until 1919. Then, following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the wave of popular rebellions that rippled through Asia subsequently, the then king of Afghanistan, Amanullah, declared his country’s full independence by singing a treaty of aid and friendship with Lenin, and declaring war on Britain. After a brief period of border skirmishes, and the bombing of Kabul by the Royal Air Force, Britain conceded Afghanistan’s independence. Stung by this turn of events though, Britain conspired with conservative religious and land owning elements with the country who were unhappy with Amanullah’s attempts to secularize and reform the country. The outbreak of an uprising and civil war forced him to abdicate in 1929. Different warlords contended for power until a new king, Muhammad Nadir Shah took power. He was assassinated four years later by the son of a state execution victim, and was succeeded by Muhammad Zahir Shah, who was to be Afghanistan’s last king, and who would rule for the next 40 years.
Zahir Shah’s rule, like the kings before him, was one of almost total autocratic power. The word of the king was the word of law. And while advisory councils and assemblies were sometimes called to advise the king, these bodies had no power, and in no way represented the people of Afghanistan. These bodies were made up of the country’s tribal elders – a nice sounding term that in reality referred to the brutal land owners and patriarchs. And while some history books refer to this time of Afghanistan’s history as one where attempts were made to “modernize” the country – all this really meant was newer rifles for the army, the purchase a few airplanes for a token air force, the creation of a tiny airline to shuttle the ruling elite around, and some telegraph wires to allow the king to collect this taxes more promptly. Under his rule political parties were outlawed, and students were shot and killed when they protested.
In 1973, the king was overthrown and a republic was declared. But this in reality represented very little. For the king had simply been overthrown by a prominent member of his own family, Daoud, who decided to title himself president instead of king.
Under Daoud a certain liberalization took place, meaning that some of the most draconian realities of the monarchy were rolled back, but by and large whatever hopes and expectations arose among the people – little was done to satisfy them.
Daoud had seized power with the help of an underground party named the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan – a pro-Moscow communist party. The PDPA had aided and collaborated with Daoud in exchange for government posts. Once he had consolidated power though and felt he no longer needed these controversial allies, he ditched them, and ordered a crack down upon the party.
In 1978 the PDPA seized power from Daoud in a military coup. After seizing power they began a series of limited reforms, such as declaring, more or less, a secular state, and that women were deserving of equal treatment of men. They sought to curtail the practice of purchasing brides, and tried to implement a land reform program. They quickly met with fierce opposition from many sections of the deeply religious population though. The PDPA’s response to this was very heavy-handed, aggravating the situation. Soon several rural areas rose in open armed rebellion against the new government.
At the same time, the party’s long history of factionalism came to a bloody head as the more radical wing of the party sought to wipe out the more moderate leaning wing.
Immediately following the PDPA coup, the Soviet Union took an active interest in the so-called socialist revolution unfolding in its backyard. Dismayed by the clumsiness of the radical faction of the PDPA, the Soviet Union invaded in 1979 and handed power over a man named Karmal, who was the leader of the more moderate faction of the PDPA.
Though perhaps this was not the Soviets original intent, once inside Afghanistan, they found themselves forced to commit more and more troops and material to prop up the unpopular PDPA government. Several Islamic fundamentalist groups sprang up and began waging guerilla warfare, many of them operating from camps set up by the CIA and Pakistani Intelligence within Pakistan, from which they could strike into Afghanistan, and then beat a hasty retreat over a guarded border.
For its part, the United States government initially paid little attention to the PDPA coup in Afghanistan; its attention was instead focused to the west, where a popular revolution has overthrown their most valuable Middle East ally, the brutal and autocratic Shah of Iran. This changed of course once the Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan.
At that point the United States took an active interest in the Islamic fundamentalists waging war on the PDPA and the Soviets. The CIA began providing military training to the Mujahadeen – the name the Islamic guerillas came to be called. They provided what in the end amounted to billions of dollars worth of weapons, including sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles that allowed the guerillas to take out modern Soviet tanks and jet planes.
After offensive after offensive, year after year, gradually the Soviet military became discouraged. They were able to occupy and hold all of the major cities, just at the British imperialists had been able to the century before, but they were unable to subjugate the countryside. Soviet causalities began to mount dramatically, and with the CIA’s providing the Mujahadeen with Stinger missiles, even their control of the air was becoming a costly affair.
At the same time the CIA kept increasing and updating the Mujahadeen’s supply of weaponry, the Saudis and Persian Gulf Emirates contributed billions of dollars to their coffers, and thousands of Arabs responded to the Mujahadeen’s call for jihad, or holy war, against the secular Soviets – including the wealthy Saudi playboy, Osama bin Laden – who quickly became one of the CIA’s most important operatives in its proxy war against communism.
In 1989 the Soviets withdrew, leaving the PDPA government to fend for itself. The CIA soon lost interest in its mercenary forces now that they had accomplished their mission of bleeding the Soviets white. The misc. Mujahadeen factions began fighting as much with themselves as with the PDPA forces, resulting in increased suffering and bloodshed. It wasn’t until 1992 that Mujahadeen fighters were able to topple the remnants of the PDPA government – ending the Stalinists attempts to bring revolution to the people of Afghanistan at the point of a gun.
Different Mujahadeen warlords occupied different cities and regions of the country. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the same Northern Alliance warlord who recently took Kabul from the Taliban, was the warlord who ruled over the city from 1992 until his ouster in 1996. During his reign over 60,000 people were murdered and thousands of women were raped. Current Northern Alliance warlord Rashid Dostum who is in control of the city of Mazar –E – Sharif, also ruled over it from 1992 until his ouster in 1997. Similarly the warlord Ismail Khan again rules the city of Heart, which he also ruled from 1992 to 1995; and warlord Yunis Khalis is back in control of Jalabad, which he ruled from 1992 to 1996.
The collapse of the PDPA government did not mark the end of Afghanistan’s civil war. The Mujahadeen warlords continued to bring death and destruction upon the country as they fought over the spoils, and sought to enlarge their new fiefdoms at the expense of their neighboring rivals.
While the CIA, after having done such a fine job of instigating unrest and warfare in the 1980s, could care less about the aftermath, Pakistani Intelligence forces maintained their interest. Seeking to end the civil war which threatened the stability of their own country – itself a prison house of many nationalities – Pakistani Intelligence aided in the creation of a new Islamic fundamentalist movement, the Taliban. The Taliban was born in the Islamic schools that had sprung up inside the Afghan refugee camps inside Pakistan. Its leadership and the bulk of its initial ranks, were made up of young religious students, primarily Pashtuns, motivated by the zeal of religion and the belief that they were ordained to bring stability and the ways of Allah back to their war torn land. They railed against the corruption, greed and factionalism of the contending Mujahadeen factions inside Afghanistan, and when they mounted a military push to conquer the country, they were initially well received by certain sections of the weary population. Their ranks were filled by rank and file Mujahadeen fighters and young idealists from inside the country, and city-by-city they were able to occupy most of the country. In 1996 they captured the capital city of Kabul, and had forced most of the remaining warlords into a small pocket in the far north of the country. These warlords subsequently formed a defensive alliance termed the Northern Alliance. By the time of the start of the current war, Taliban offensives had reduced their enclave to a mere 10% of the country.
Once in power the Taliban sought to create a theocratic state based on their interpretations of the Koran. Though already severely repressed by the various Mujahadeen warlords, the plight of Afghanistan’s women was made even worse under the new regime. The veil became the law of the land, and women were forbidden from attending school or holding employment outside of the home. Television was banned and an effort was made to purge the country of any signs or remnants of secular or Western influence. The country became politically and diplomatically isolated.
Then came the current war. Following the September 11 World Trade Center bombings the United States accused Osama Bin Laden of the crime. Bin Laden, who had left Afghanistan following the defeat of the Soviets, had returned after falling out of favor in Saudi Arabia, and being pressured to leave his first nation of refuge, the Sudan.
The U.S. government demanded that the Taliban hand over Bin Laden. The Taliban’s response was to demand proof of Bin Laden’s guilt, and after receiving none, they refused to hand him over.
Within a few weeks the United States began bombing the impoverished country, as well as providing active support to the Northern Alliance warlords. Following weeks of devastating bombing, and several failed offensives, the Northern Alliance succeeded in breaking out of its northern enclave, seizing the city of Mazar – E – Sharif, and then moving on to take Kabul. This set in motion a series of defeats for the Taliban, which began surrendering and abandoning almost every major city in the country, and retreating into the mountains. The U.S. meanwhile has continued its bombing campaign, and now has Marines on the ground hunting for Bin Laden. All the while the people of Afghanistan continue to suffer.
The United Nations, hardly a radical source of information, has estimated that up to 8 million Afghanis may starve this winter due to a shortage of food, made all the more severe by the intentional U.S. disruption of humanitarian aid, and bombing of Red Cross and other humanitarian aid facilities inside the country. At least hundreds, and more likely thousands, have been killed by U.S. bombs, and many more are dieing as the Northern Alliance and Taliban warlords fight it out. Hundreds of thousands of land mines and unexploded cluster bombs lay scattered across the nation’s landscape. And there is no end in sight to the misery.
It’s hard to say how much longer the Taliban will continue to fight, or when the U.S. will end its war. Afghanistan’s future, like its past, looks very dark indeed. Currently Northern Alliance warlords, southern Pashtun warlords, opportunistic émigré politicians, and even supporters of the aging deposed autocrat King Zahir Shah, are arguing about who will be the exploiter-in-chief of the devastated land. Most likely they will come up with some sort of coalition government – that will perhaps hold the different factions together, perhaps not. In the end it matters little, since none of the figures involved represent the people of this country, and none of them seem to have ever had their interests at heart.
What is the solution for Afghanistan? What will end the suffering of its people? The most immediate thing would be for the United States government to end its bombing, withdraw its troops, and respect the Afghan peoples right to self-determination. And while this alone would not end all of the bloodshed and the fighting, it would create a situation where the workers and farmers of Afghanistan would be more able to cast off the warlords and petty feudal tyrants, take control of their destinies, and create a society that is based upon cooperation and solidarity. Towards that end let us redouble our efforts to stop the U.S. bombing, to stop the U.S. war on the people of Afghanistan!
Prior to Karzai, Burhanuddin Rabbani served as President in the year 2000 since his government was recognized by the United Nations.
In his earlier stint from 1992-1996 until Rabbani was forced to leave Kabul because of the Taliban, Sunni Islamic Nationalists takeover of the city at the behest of Mullah Mohammed Omar Afghanistan's de facto head of state from 1996 to 2001. 
Rabbani fell out of favor with his former allies, the Taliban. However, supported by an organization that became known as the Northern Alliance, Rabbani continued to resist the new Afghan government, and the civil war continued with the help of Ahmad Shah Masud called the "Lion of Panjshir", and then top military chief of the anti-taliban UINFSA (1997-2001), also called Northern Alliance; since 1997 minister of Defence of the Government of the Islamic State internationally recognized who died on 15 September 2001 from his wounds sustained in an assassination atempt suffered on 9 September. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Rabbani agreed to cooperate with American and NATO forces to remove the Taliban from power. With help from coalition troops, Kabul was soon captured and Rabbani became the first president. He was reinstalled in Kabul claiming to be the provisional president on 17 Nov 2001. Soon after, he relinquished control to Hamid Karzai and he is now heading the Jamiat-e Islami party of Afghanistan. 
Under the current constitution of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah has been honorfied as the Father of the Nation. Earlier, he came to the throne at the age of 19, after the assassination of his father in November 1933, having previously served as a Cabinet minister. For a number of years Shah remained in the background while his uncle Shah Mahmood Khan ran the government, but he asserted his power through the constitution of 1964, which established a constitutional monarchy and prohibited royal relatives from holding public office.
Shah undertook a number of economic-development projects, including irrigation and highway construction, backed by foreign aid, largely from the United States and the Soviet Union. He was also able to maintain Afghanistan's neutral position in international politics. His reforms seemed to have little effect outside the Kabul area, however. In the early 1970s the country suffered drought and famine. Pashto tribes along the Pakistan border continued to press for autonomy, and the political structure in the capital was unable to deal with the country's economic problems. In a bloodless coup on July 17, 1973, Zahir Shah was deposed. The leader of the coup, Mohammad Daud Khan (the king's brother-in-law), proclaimed Afghanistan a republic with himself as its president.
Daud Khan overthrew the monarchy of Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1973 to establish Afghanistan as a republic. He served as the country's president from 1973 to 1978. He was overthrown and assassinated in the coup ("Saur Revolution") staged by the military and the Communist Party on 27 April 1978.After Daud Khan, Nur Mohammad Taraki served as the President of the Democratic Republic and of the Revolutionary Council from 30 April 1978 to 16 September 1979. He was arrested on 16 September 1979 and executed shortly after by order of Hafizullah Amin who took over as President of the Democratic Republic and of the Revolutionary Council from 16 September to 27 December 1979. He was also overthrown and killed by the Soviet Army on 27 Dec 1979.
Babrak Karmal took over as the President of the Democratic Republic and of the Revolutionary Council from 27 December 1979 to 20 November 1986; He was removed from power at the Soviet request. He died on 3 December 1996 in Moscow . Mohammad Najibullah took over as President of the Republic from 30 September 1987 to 16 April 1992 . In May, 1996 a theology professor at Kabul University, a Tajik, Burhanuddin Rabbani, became president.
Among his first decrees was to mandate the wearing of the burqa by Kabul's relatively well-educated and sophisticated women, and to ban women newscasters from television. The U.S. recognized his government, maintaining cordial relations while soon detaching itself from the situation it had produced. The Soviet Union withdrew in 1989, but continued to provide military assistance worth billions of dollars to the PDPA regime until the USSR's collapse in 1991. The Mujahideen established a new government in Kabul led by Sebghatullah Mujaddeddi. But the Mujahideen were soon torn by factional struggles, particularly between Massoud's group and the Fundamentalist party of Hekmatyar. In the wake of Mujahedeen brutalities in the country the Taliban forces took Kabul in 1996. Najibullah who had taken refuge in the UN compound was captured castrated and hanged after he was handed over by his own intelligence chief, Rashid Dostum executed by the Taliban on 27 September 1996.
Najibullah had been living there under UN protection for four and a half years, since his government fell in 1992. The hapless pair of Najibullah and his brother were hanged from a traffic control box after their bodies were bloodied, tortured and mutilated bodies. Currently President Karzai has appointed his 2 vice presidents and his ministers.
First Vice President Ahmad Zia Masood
Second Vice President Mohammad Karim Khalili
Senior Minister in the Cabinet
H.E. Hedayat Amin Arsala
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta
Minister of National Defense
H.E. General Abdul Rahim Wardak
Ministry of Interior Affairs
H.E. Zarar Ahmad Moqbel
Ministry of Finance
H.E. Dr. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi
Ministry of Economy
H.E. Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams
Ministry of Justice
H.E. Sarwar Danish
Ministry of Culture and Youth
Affairs
H.E. Abdul Karim Khoram
Ministry of Education
H.E. DR. Mohamad Hanif Atmar
Ministry of Higher Education
H.E. Dr. Ahzam Dadfar
Ministry of Commerce
H. E. Dr. Mohammad Amin Farhang
Ministry of Water & Energy
H.E. Mohammad Ismail Khan
Minister of Transportand Aviation
H.E. Eng. Nehmatullah Ehsan Jawid
Ministry of Women Affairs
H.E. Mrs. Hosn Bano Ghazanfar
Ministry of Hajj and Islamic Affairs
H.E. Nehmatullah Shahrani
Minister of Public Welfare
H.E. Sohrab Ali Saffary
Minister of Public Health
H.E. Dr. Mohammad Amin Fatimie
Minister of Agriculture
H.E. Obaidullah Ramin M
Ministry of Mines
H.E. Ibrahim Adel
Ministry of Communication
H.E. Eng. Amirzai Sangin
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
H.E. Ehsan Zia
Ministry of Work, Social Affairs, Martyred, and Disabled
H.E. Noor Mohammad Qarqeen
Ministry of Borders & Tribal Affairs
H.E. Karim Barahowie
Ministry of Urban Development
H.E. Engineer Yousef Pashtun
Ministry of Anti-Narcotics
H.E. Habibullah Qaderi
Ministry of Refugees
H.E. Mohammad Akbar
Heads of State of Afghanistan since 1919
Emirate of Afghanistan: Amanullah Khan | Inayatullah Khan | Habibullah Ghazi
Kingdom of Afghanistan: Mohammed Nadir Shah | Mohammed Zahir Shah
Daoud's Republic of Afghanistan: Mohammed Daoud Khan
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: Nur Muhammad Taraki | Hafizullah Amin | Babrak Karmal | Haji Mohammad Chamkani | Mohammad Najibullah
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Sibghatullah Mojaddedi | Burhanuddin Rabbani
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Mohammed Omar
Afghanistan Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Burhanuddin Rabbani (Northern Alliance)| Hamid Karzai
A Brief History of Afghanistan: By Adam Ritscher
This was delivered as a speech at a Students Against War teach-in in Duluth, Minnesota (USA)
The story of Afghanistan is in so many ways a very tragic one. Afghanistan is one of the most impoverished nations of the world. It is one of the most war-torn, most ravaged, and most beleaguered of nations. It is a nation that has been beset by invasion, external pressure and internal upheaval since before the time of Alexander the Great. Its people are a people who have endured more than most of us can ever imagine. In fact, for many Afghanis, all that has changed in the last one thousand years are the weapons which have been used against so many of them. It is therefore with great sadness and respect that I tell the story of Afghanistan.
First of all, who are the Afghanis? Afghanistan has historically been the link between Central Asia, the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent. It is therefore a nation made up of many different nationalities – the result of innumerable invasions and migrations. Within its current borders there are at least a dozen major ethnic groups – Baluch, Chahar Aimak, Turkmen, Hazara, Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Nuristani, Arab, Kirghiz, Pashai and Persian.
Historically the Pashtun nationality has been the most dominant. The term Afghan, for example, generally is viewed by other peoples in the country to refer to the Pashtuns. The royal families of the country were Pashtun, and today the Pashtun represent about 50% of the total population. Tajiks come in second with 25%, and the rest make up considerably smaller percentages.
Within the country there are tiny Hindu, Sikh and Jewish communities, but the vast majority of this people are Muslims – and in fact many ethnic groups consider Islam to be one of the defining aspects of their ethnic identity. This is true of the Pashtun for example.
Islam was brought to Afghanistan during the eight and ninth century by the Arabs. Prior to that the nation had been ruled by various Persian, Greek, Sassasian and Central Asian empires. Following a subsequent break down in Arab rule, semi-independent states began to form. These local dynasties and states however were overwhelmed and crushed during the Mongolian invasions of the 1200s – conquerors who were to remain in control of part or all of the country until the 1500s, despite much resistance and internal strife. Following the collapse of Mongol rule, Afghanistan found itself in a situation much like what has continued into modern times – caught between the vice of two great powers. During this time it was the Mughals of northern India and the Safavids of Iran that fought over the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan. Armies marched to and fro devastating the land and murdering the people, laying siege to city after city, and destroying whatever had been left by the invading army that preceded it.
It was not until 1747 that Afghanistan was able to free itself. This was the year that Nadir Shah, an empire builder from Iran, died and left a vacuum in central Asia that a former Afghan bodyguard, named Ahmed Shah, was able to fill. Ahmad was a Pashtun, and his Pashtun clan was to rule Afghanistan, in one form or another, for the next 200 years.
Ahmad was able to unify the different Afghan tribes, and went on to conquer considerable parts of what are today eastern Iran, Pakistan, northern India and Uzbekistan. His successors though proved unable to hold his vast empire together, and within 50 years much of it had been seized by rival regional powers. Within the country there were numerous bloody civil wars for the throne, and for many Afghanis it meant little that their lives were now being uprooted and destroyed by ethnic kin, as opposed to foreign invaders.
Beginning in the 1800s Afghanistan’s internal affairs became dramatically aggravated by the increasing intervention by two new imperialist powers – the British Empire and Czarist Russia. The British were expanding and consolidating their colonial holdings on the India sub-continent, and were looking at the Hindu Kush mountains of Afghanistan as a natural barrier to prevent invasion by rival imperialists. The Russians, for their part, were expanding south and east, swallowing up several formerly independent sultanates and emirates in Central Asia. The two great powers essentially engaged in a race for Afghanistan, and their fiendish seizures of land, overthrow of indigenous nations and reckless interference into the affairs of the remaining independent states in the region became known as “the Great Game.”
Imperialists often give such trivial, and even humorous, sounding names to their interventionist schemes, but don’t be fooled into thinking that the peoples of the region experienced the consequences of these actions in a manner that they in any way would have interpreted as a game. For them the consequences were devastating. The arrival of European imperialism into the region simply accelerated, and made more devastating, the wars, poverty and material destruction that had already wracked the region.
During this time, on two separate occasions, British armies from India outright invaded Afghanistan in attempts to install puppet governments amenable to British economic interests, and that would oppose the economic interests of Czarist Russia.
The first, which became known as the First Anglo-Afghan War, took place in 1838. Outraged by the presence of a single Russian diplomat in Kabul, the British demanded that Afghanistan shun any contact with Russia or Iran, and that it hand over vast tracts of Pashtun inhabited land to British India (regions that are today party of Pakistan). Dost Mohammad, the Afghan ruler, agreed to these humiliating demands, but the British still invaded the country. The British seized most of the major cities in Afghanistan with little resistance, but their heavy handed rule soon resulted in a popular uprising by the people which resulted in the massacre of the entire British army of 15,000, save one.
British outrage over the uninvited arrival of a Russian diplomatic envoy in Kabul in 1878 resulted in the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Again the British were able to occupy all of the major cities, but unlike the last time, the British got wind of an impending rebellion against their occupation, and brutally crushed it in a pre-emptive move. They did subsequently withdraw, but not before they set up a puppet ruler and forced the country to hand over control of its foreign affairs to Britain.
Afghanistan would remain a British protectorate until 1919. Then, following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the wave of popular rebellions that rippled through Asia subsequently, the then king of Afghanistan, Amanullah, declared his country’s full independence by singing a treaty of aid and friendship with Lenin, and declaring war on Britain. After a brief period of border skirmishes, and the bombing of Kabul by the Royal Air Force, Britain conceded Afghanistan’s independence. Stung by this turn of events though, Britain conspired with conservative religious and land owning elements with the country who were unhappy with Amanullah’s attempts to secularize and reform the country. The outbreak of an uprising and civil war forced him to abdicate in 1929. Different warlords contended for power until a new king, Muhammad Nadir Shah took power. He was assassinated four years later by the son of a state execution victim, and was succeeded by Muhammad Zahir Shah, who was to be Afghanistan’s last king, and who would rule for the next 40 years.
Zahir Shah’s rule, like the kings before him, was one of almost total autocratic power. The word of the king was the word of law. And while advisory councils and assemblies were sometimes called to advise the king, these bodies had no power, and in no way represented the people of Afghanistan. These bodies were made up of the country’s tribal elders – a nice sounding term that in reality referred to the brutal land owners and patriarchs. And while some history books refer to this time of Afghanistan’s history as one where attempts were made to “modernize” the country – all this really meant was newer rifles for the army, the purchase a few airplanes for a token air force, the creation of a tiny airline to shuttle the ruling elite around, and some telegraph wires to allow the king to collect this taxes more promptly. Under his rule political parties were outlawed, and students were shot and killed when they protested.
In 1973, the king was overthrown and a republic was declared. But this in reality represented very little. For the king had simply been overthrown by a prominent member of his own family, Daoud, who decided to title himself president instead of king.
Under Daoud a certain liberalization took place, meaning that some of the most draconian realities of the monarchy were rolled back, but by and large whatever hopes and expectations arose among the people – little was done to satisfy them.
Daoud had seized power with the help of an underground party named the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan – a pro-Moscow communist party. The PDPA had aided and collaborated with Daoud in exchange for government posts. Once he had consolidated power though and felt he no longer needed these controversial allies, he ditched them, and ordered a crack down upon the party.
In 1978 the PDPA seized power from Daoud in a military coup. After seizing power they began a series of limited reforms, such as declaring, more or less, a secular state, and that women were deserving of equal treatment of men. They sought to curtail the practice of purchasing brides, and tried to implement a land reform program. They quickly met with fierce opposition from many sections of the deeply religious population though. The PDPA’s response to this was very heavy-handed, aggravating the situation. Soon several rural areas rose in open armed rebellion against the new government.
At the same time, the party’s long history of factionalism came to a bloody head as the more radical wing of the party sought to wipe out the more moderate leaning wing.
Immediately following the PDPA coup, the Soviet Union took an active interest in the so-called socialist revolution unfolding in its backyard. Dismayed by the clumsiness of the radical faction of the PDPA, the Soviet Union invaded in 1979 and handed power over a man named Karmal, who was the leader of the more moderate faction of the PDPA.
Though perhaps this was not the Soviets original intent, once inside Afghanistan, they found themselves forced to commit more and more troops and material to prop up the unpopular PDPA government. Several Islamic fundamentalist groups sprang up and began waging guerilla warfare, many of them operating from camps set up by the CIA and Pakistani Intelligence within Pakistan, from which they could strike into Afghanistan, and then beat a hasty retreat over a guarded border.
For its part, the United States government initially paid little attention to the PDPA coup in Afghanistan; its attention was instead focused to the west, where a popular revolution has overthrown their most valuable Middle East ally, the brutal and autocratic Shah of Iran. This changed of course once the Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan.
At that point the United States took an active interest in the Islamic fundamentalists waging war on the PDPA and the Soviets. The CIA began providing military training to the Mujahadeen – the name the Islamic guerillas came to be called. They provided what in the end amounted to billions of dollars worth of weapons, including sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles that allowed the guerillas to take out modern Soviet tanks and jet planes.
After offensive after offensive, year after year, gradually the Soviet military became discouraged. They were able to occupy and hold all of the major cities, just at the British imperialists had been able to the century before, but they were unable to subjugate the countryside. Soviet causalities began to mount dramatically, and with the CIA’s providing the Mujahadeen with Stinger missiles, even their control of the air was becoming a costly affair.
At the same time the CIA kept increasing and updating the Mujahadeen’s supply of weaponry, the Saudis and Persian Gulf Emirates contributed billions of dollars to their coffers, and thousands of Arabs responded to the Mujahadeen’s call for jihad, or holy war, against the secular Soviets – including the wealthy Saudi playboy, Osama bin Laden – who quickly became one of the CIA’s most important operatives in its proxy war against communism.
In 1989 the Soviets withdrew, leaving the PDPA government to fend for itself. The CIA soon lost interest in its mercenary forces now that they had accomplished their mission of bleeding the Soviets white. The misc. Mujahadeen factions began fighting as much with themselves as with the PDPA forces, resulting in increased suffering and bloodshed. It wasn’t until 1992 that Mujahadeen fighters were able to topple the remnants of the PDPA government – ending the Stalinists attempts to bring revolution to the people of Afghanistan at the point of a gun.
Different Mujahadeen warlords occupied different cities and regions of the country. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the same Northern Alliance warlord who recently took Kabul from the Taliban, was the warlord who ruled over the city from 1992 until his ouster in 1996. During his reign over 60,000 people were murdered and thousands of women were raped. Current Northern Alliance warlord Rashid Dostum who is in control of the city of Mazar –E – Sharif, also ruled over it from 1992 until his ouster in 1997. Similarly the warlord Ismail Khan again rules the city of Heart, which he also ruled from 1992 to 1995; and warlord Yunis Khalis is back in control of Jalabad, which he ruled from 1992 to 1996.
The collapse of the PDPA government did not mark the end of Afghanistan’s civil war. The Mujahadeen warlords continued to bring death and destruction upon the country as they fought over the spoils, and sought to enlarge their new fiefdoms at the expense of their neighboring rivals.
While the CIA, after having done such a fine job of instigating unrest and warfare in the 1980s, could care less about the aftermath, Pakistani Intelligence forces maintained their interest. Seeking to end the civil war which threatened the stability of their own country – itself a prison house of many nationalities – Pakistani Intelligence aided in the creation of a new Islamic fundamentalist movement, the Taliban. The Taliban was born in the Islamic schools that had sprung up inside the Afghan refugee camps inside Pakistan. Its leadership and the bulk of its initial ranks, were made up of young religious students, primarily Pashtuns, motivated by the zeal of religion and the belief that they were ordained to bring stability and the ways of Allah back to their war torn land. They railed against the corruption, greed and factionalism of the contending Mujahadeen factions inside Afghanistan, and when they mounted a military push to conquer the country, they were initially well received by certain sections of the weary population. Their ranks were filled by rank and file Mujahadeen fighters and young idealists from inside the country, and city-by-city they were able to occupy most of the country. In 1996 they captured the capital city of Kabul, and had forced most of the remaining warlords into a small pocket in the far north of the country. These warlords subsequently formed a defensive alliance termed the Northern Alliance. By the time of the start of the current war, Taliban offensives had reduced their enclave to a mere 10% of the country.
Once in power the Taliban sought to create a theocratic state based on their interpretations of the Koran. Though already severely repressed by the various Mujahadeen warlords, the plight of Afghanistan’s women was made even worse under the new regime. The veil became the law of the land, and women were forbidden from attending school or holding employment outside of the home. Television was banned and an effort was made to purge the country of any signs or remnants of secular or Western influence. The country became politically and diplomatically isolated.
Then came the current war. Following the September 11 World Trade Center bombings the United States accused Osama Bin Laden of the crime. Bin Laden, who had left Afghanistan following the defeat of the Soviets, had returned after falling out of favor in Saudi Arabia, and being pressured to leave his first nation of refuge, the Sudan.
The U.S. government demanded that the Taliban hand over Bin Laden. The Taliban’s response was to demand proof of Bin Laden’s guilt, and after receiving none, they refused to hand him over.
Within a few weeks the United States began bombing the impoverished country, as well as providing active support to the Northern Alliance warlords. Following weeks of devastating bombing, and several failed offensives, the Northern Alliance succeeded in breaking out of its northern enclave, seizing the city of Mazar – E – Sharif, and then moving on to take Kabul. This set in motion a series of defeats for the Taliban, which began surrendering and abandoning almost every major city in the country, and retreating into the mountains. The U.S. meanwhile has continued its bombing campaign, and now has Marines on the ground hunting for Bin Laden. All the while the people of Afghanistan continue to suffer.
The United Nations, hardly a radical source of information, has estimated that up to 8 million Afghanis may starve this winter due to a shortage of food, made all the more severe by the intentional U.S. disruption of humanitarian aid, and bombing of Red Cross and other humanitarian aid facilities inside the country. At least hundreds, and more likely thousands, have been killed by U.S. bombs, and many more are dieing as the Northern Alliance and Taliban warlords fight it out. Hundreds of thousands of land mines and unexploded cluster bombs lay scattered across the nation’s landscape. And there is no end in sight to the misery.
It’s hard to say how much longer the Taliban will continue to fight, or when the U.S. will end its war. Afghanistan’s future, like its past, looks very dark indeed. Currently Northern Alliance warlords, southern Pashtun warlords, opportunistic émigré politicians, and even supporters of the aging deposed autocrat King Zahir Shah, are arguing about who will be the exploiter-in-chief of the devastated land. Most likely they will come up with some sort of coalition government – that will perhaps hold the different factions together, perhaps not. In the end it matters little, since none of the figures involved represent the people of this country, and none of them seem to have ever had their interests at heart.
What is the solution for Afghanistan? What will end the suffering of its people? The most immediate thing would be for the United States government to end its bombing, withdraw its troops, and respect the Afghan peoples right to self-determination. And while this alone would not end all of the bloodshed and the fighting, it would create a situation where the workers and farmers of Afghanistan would be more able to cast off the warlords and petty feudal tyrants, take control of their destinies, and create a society that is based upon cooperation and solidarity. Towards that end let us redouble our efforts to stop the U.S. bombing, to stop the U.S. war on the people of Afghanistan!
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
Global Action to Make Burma (Myanmar) Democratic
The United States and the 27-member European Union has asked the U.N. Security Council to consider sanctions against Burma (Myanmar) and condemned the country's ruling junta's violence against demonstrators.
"We condemn all violence against peaceful demonstrators and remind the country's leaders of their personal responsibilities (for) their actions," the US-EU statement said. "We call on the Security Council to discuss this situation urgently and to consider further steps including sanctions."
The statement, after a ministerial meeting on the fringes of the U.N. General Assembly, said, "We call on the authorities to stop violence and to open a process of dialogue with pro-democracy leaders, including Aung San San Suu Kyi, and representatives of ethnic minorities."
on the opening day of the 192-member UN General Assembly's 62nd session , US President George W. Bush unveiled new sanctions on Myanmar's ruling junta and urged global pressure for democratic reforms to end the junta's decades-old "reign of fear."
After he spoke, the junta imposed curfews on Myanmar's two largest cities . On September 26, India said Burma's political reform process and national reconciliation should be more broad-based and hoped all sides would resolve their issues peacefully.
Government is concerned at and is closely monitoring the situation in Burma , an External Affairs Ministry spokesperson said. It is hoped that all sides will resolve their issues peacefully through dialogue.
At least three Buddhist monks were killed in clashes with Burma's security forces who cracked down on protests against the ruling military junta in Yangon and other areas of the country.
PRESS CONFERENCE on myanmar
Speaking to correspondents at a Headquarters press conference on 5 September 2007, Ibrahim Gambari, Special Adviser on the International Compact with Iraq and Other Issues, reiterated, on the Secretary-General’s behalf, the call on Myanmar’s authorities to release political detainees, including those arrested during recent peaceful demonstrations.
Mr. Gambari said that recent disturbing events in Myanmar were all the more disappointing as they not only called into question the authorities’ stated commitment to democratization and national reconciliation, but also made it more difficult to maintain international support for engagement with Myanmar at a time when the country needed assistance in addressing numerous pressing challenges.
He also referred to the completion yesterday, after 14 years, of the National Convention process. Opened in 1993, the Convention was supposed to be the first step on the Government’s road map to democracy, laying down basic guidelines to draft a new constitution.
While acknowledging the conclusion of the process, he expressed concern over the inclusiveness of the process to date, as well as reports of the provisions adopted at the Convention, which were seemingly contrary to the objectives of national reconciliation and democratization. There should be opportunities in the period ahead to improve on the outcome of the document of the Convention in ways that would be more inclusive, participatory and transparent, he said. After all, the Constitution was supposed to be a document to guide the nation for hundreds of years. It was thus very important for those who were presently excluded from the process that had produced the current outcome to be given an opportunity to present their input.
He said that the United Nations was the only international actor to maintain face-to-face dialogue with Myanmar’s top leadership and with Aung San Suu Kyi, the country’s detained opposition leader, about the need for national reconciliation, democracy and respect for human rights and was keenly aware of its responsibility and the expectations riding on it.
As to how the Organization’s current efforts were different from those of his predecessors, he said that the United Nations was moving to line up support from the international community, recognizing that all key interested countries needed to work together. The initial consultations that he had been involved in were now complete, following his visits to Washington, DC, Beijing, New Deli, Tokyo, Moscow, Paris, the European Union in Brussels, and London, as well as neighbouring countries, whose role was critical. Everywhere, his interlocutors had expressed concern about the situation in Myanmar and strong support for the Secretary-General’s good offices. They had also expressed a readiness to proactively consider ways of working with one another, Myanmar and the United Nations to get concrete results. Thus, for the first time, all the key actors were now mobilized and the international community was moving in a single direction.
Given the complexity of the situation and the diversity of the challenges in Myanmar, the Organization was now taking a more comprehensive approach, he continued. Its focus would be such as the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, the cessation of hostilities, humanitarian access and progress in implementing the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in the areas of education and health. The broader the agenda, he added, the higher the likelihood of finding common ground “in order to make progress where progress can be made and demonstrated”. The Government’s agreement with the International Labour Organization (ILO) in February to address a forced labour complaint was a good example of what could be done when the authorities in Myanmar engaged seriously with the United Nations in addressing a pressing concern. There was also certainly a greater openness to the United Nations across a range of other topics, which had been seen during his own two visits to the country in the past year, as well as those of the Deputy Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs and a June visit by Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict.
While serious changes were needed, only very modest steps had been taken on certain “big-ticket issues”, and he was not going to proclaim otherwise, he said. At the same time, it was important to keep in mind that, for almost three years, there had been no opening at all for dialogue between the international community and Myanmar. Therefore, it was necessary to continue to explore where the current relative openness could lead in terms of real cooperation, engagement and concrete results for the people of the country. His own next step would be to return to Myanmar as soon as possible to continue conversations with key players and deliver the Secretary-General’s message as his Special Envoy to the country. He expected that trip to take place some time in mid-October.
In conclusion, he said that, with all his interlocutors, he had emphasized that good offices were not an event, but a process, which needed to be translated into tangible results on multiple fronts. The expectations of the United Nations and the international community were very clear and required concrete results from Myanmar, and he would continue to carry that message.
Asked about the position of China, he said that he was not prepared to share what the Chinese had said privately, but he knew that they had facilitated contact and communication between the United States and Myanmar. In expressing their support for the good offices of the Secretary-General, they had also sent an appropriate message to the authorities of Myanmar to cooperate fully with them and to help ensure that the next visit would produce results.
To numerous questions regarding the role of the Security Council in relation to Myanmar, he said that the Council had decided to place Myanmar on its agenda, but when efforts had been made to move to the next step, which was to have a resolution, “I think you know the results.” It was up to the members of the Council to decide what they wanted to discuss and how they wanted to discuss it. Of course, if they asked the Secretariat to brief them, it would do so. In fact, he had briefed the Council on three different occasions.
The good offices of the Secretary-General had been mandated by the General Assembly and not the Security Council, he continued. The Security Council had its own agenda and could decide what and when it wanted something.
Asked if the United Nations was the right venue for dealing with human rights issues in Myanmar, he said that isolation and sanctions had not worked so far, and the Security Council resolution might not have worked, but that did not mean that Security Council action might not be helpful. The Secretary-General had a role under the mandate from the General Assembly to find ways of building international support for his action, so that the authorities would address the issues he had mentioned. Those efforts should be given a chance, because those countries that had voted against a resolution of the Security Council, while recognizing that there were problems in Myanmar, did not think that the Security Council was the appropriate forum to act on them. They had mentioned the Human Rights Council, in that regard. Under those circumstances, the Secretary-General’s good offices should be used as a means to get the results required.
Asked about the role of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he said that a recent meeting of ASEAN Ministers had agreed in principle to establish a human rights mechanism. That was an important step, because Myanmar had gone along with that, fully aware that once that mechanism was established, it would look at human rights records of ASEAN Member States. He hoped all ASEAN countries would cooperate in the work of such a mechanism.
Asked about the Secretary-General’s answer to Mrs. Bush’s letter regarding Myanmar, he said that the response had been hand-delivered to the White House on 19 June. The Secretary-General supported Mrs. Bush’s efforts to draw attention to the situation in Myanmar and pledged to work with her and others towards the goals of democratization, human rights, cessation of hostilities, humanitarian access and freedom for all political detainees. In a subsequent conversation, Mrs. Bush had asked the Secretary-General to exert pressure on Myanmar, and the interlocutors had pledged to maintain contact.
A correspondent commented said that there appeared to be two Myanmars in the world: one where the human rights situation was atrocious and the one that Mr. Gambari was describing. He wondered if it was Mr. Gambari’s role to be “a chief international apologist for the system” that allowed Myanmar to continue along its line at the moment.
In response, Mr. Gambari said that there was no question of apologies for any regime. He had described precisely what the Secretary-General was doing, what were the limits of his authority, what were the limits of the tools available to him. Within that, it was important to continue the best efforts to bring about concrete results. “How do you bring about change in the attitude of a regime?” he asked in that connection. “You can either change the regime, which is not an option available to us, or achieve change … by allowing international forces, particularly those that have influence on the regime, to bring it to be, and we have decided to take the second option.”
Regarding the economic situation in the country, he said that it was dire, and the decision to increase the price of petroleum had only exacerbated it. In that context, it was important to address the root causes of the present situation. While it was necessary to address the issue of arrests and detentions, it was also important to focus on basic issues of economic management and meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Also important were the problems of fair distribution of the resources available to the country. That was what the UNDP was doing.
The aspect that did not seem to interest the press corps related to the spread of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria, he continued. It was indicative, in that regard, that some of the countries that had been most critical of Myanmar’s human rights record had put together a fund of almost $100 million over the period of 10 years, because they recognized that those diseases had no boundaries and it was the people of the country that were suffering from it. Myanmar authorities’ cooperation on those issues was encouraging, and the United Nations was pushing them to extend the same cooperation to other areas, including the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need. In the absence of “big sticks”, it was important to build on every opportunity.
"We condemn all violence against peaceful demonstrators and remind the country's leaders of their personal responsibilities (for) their actions," the US-EU statement said. "We call on the Security Council to discuss this situation urgently and to consider further steps including sanctions."
The statement, after a ministerial meeting on the fringes of the U.N. General Assembly, said, "We call on the authorities to stop violence and to open a process of dialogue with pro-democracy leaders, including Aung San San Suu Kyi, and representatives of ethnic minorities."
on the opening day of the 192-member UN General Assembly's 62nd session , US President George W. Bush unveiled new sanctions on Myanmar's ruling junta and urged global pressure for democratic reforms to end the junta's decades-old "reign of fear."
After he spoke, the junta imposed curfews on Myanmar's two largest cities . On September 26, India said Burma's political reform process and national reconciliation should be more broad-based and hoped all sides would resolve their issues peacefully.
Government is concerned at and is closely monitoring the situation in Burma , an External Affairs Ministry spokesperson said. It is hoped that all sides will resolve their issues peacefully through dialogue.
At least three Buddhist monks were killed in clashes with Burma's security forces who cracked down on protests against the ruling military junta in Yangon and other areas of the country.
PRESS CONFERENCE on myanmar
Speaking to correspondents at a Headquarters press conference on 5 September 2007, Ibrahim Gambari, Special Adviser on the International Compact with Iraq and Other Issues, reiterated, on the Secretary-General’s behalf, the call on Myanmar’s authorities to release political detainees, including those arrested during recent peaceful demonstrations.
Mr. Gambari said that recent disturbing events in Myanmar were all the more disappointing as they not only called into question the authorities’ stated commitment to democratization and national reconciliation, but also made it more difficult to maintain international support for engagement with Myanmar at a time when the country needed assistance in addressing numerous pressing challenges.
He also referred to the completion yesterday, after 14 years, of the National Convention process. Opened in 1993, the Convention was supposed to be the first step on the Government’s road map to democracy, laying down basic guidelines to draft a new constitution.
While acknowledging the conclusion of the process, he expressed concern over the inclusiveness of the process to date, as well as reports of the provisions adopted at the Convention, which were seemingly contrary to the objectives of national reconciliation and democratization. There should be opportunities in the period ahead to improve on the outcome of the document of the Convention in ways that would be more inclusive, participatory and transparent, he said. After all, the Constitution was supposed to be a document to guide the nation for hundreds of years. It was thus very important for those who were presently excluded from the process that had produced the current outcome to be given an opportunity to present their input.
He said that the United Nations was the only international actor to maintain face-to-face dialogue with Myanmar’s top leadership and with Aung San Suu Kyi, the country’s detained opposition leader, about the need for national reconciliation, democracy and respect for human rights and was keenly aware of its responsibility and the expectations riding on it.
As to how the Organization’s current efforts were different from those of his predecessors, he said that the United Nations was moving to line up support from the international community, recognizing that all key interested countries needed to work together. The initial consultations that he had been involved in were now complete, following his visits to Washington, DC, Beijing, New Deli, Tokyo, Moscow, Paris, the European Union in Brussels, and London, as well as neighbouring countries, whose role was critical. Everywhere, his interlocutors had expressed concern about the situation in Myanmar and strong support for the Secretary-General’s good offices. They had also expressed a readiness to proactively consider ways of working with one another, Myanmar and the United Nations to get concrete results. Thus, for the first time, all the key actors were now mobilized and the international community was moving in a single direction.
Given the complexity of the situation and the diversity of the challenges in Myanmar, the Organization was now taking a more comprehensive approach, he continued. Its focus would be such as the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, the cessation of hostilities, humanitarian access and progress in implementing the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in the areas of education and health. The broader the agenda, he added, the higher the likelihood of finding common ground “in order to make progress where progress can be made and demonstrated”. The Government’s agreement with the International Labour Organization (ILO) in February to address a forced labour complaint was a good example of what could be done when the authorities in Myanmar engaged seriously with the United Nations in addressing a pressing concern. There was also certainly a greater openness to the United Nations across a range of other topics, which had been seen during his own two visits to the country in the past year, as well as those of the Deputy Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs and a June visit by Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict.
While serious changes were needed, only very modest steps had been taken on certain “big-ticket issues”, and he was not going to proclaim otherwise, he said. At the same time, it was important to keep in mind that, for almost three years, there had been no opening at all for dialogue between the international community and Myanmar. Therefore, it was necessary to continue to explore where the current relative openness could lead in terms of real cooperation, engagement and concrete results for the people of the country. His own next step would be to return to Myanmar as soon as possible to continue conversations with key players and deliver the Secretary-General’s message as his Special Envoy to the country. He expected that trip to take place some time in mid-October.
In conclusion, he said that, with all his interlocutors, he had emphasized that good offices were not an event, but a process, which needed to be translated into tangible results on multiple fronts. The expectations of the United Nations and the international community were very clear and required concrete results from Myanmar, and he would continue to carry that message.
Asked about the position of China, he said that he was not prepared to share what the Chinese had said privately, but he knew that they had facilitated contact and communication between the United States and Myanmar. In expressing their support for the good offices of the Secretary-General, they had also sent an appropriate message to the authorities of Myanmar to cooperate fully with them and to help ensure that the next visit would produce results.
To numerous questions regarding the role of the Security Council in relation to Myanmar, he said that the Council had decided to place Myanmar on its agenda, but when efforts had been made to move to the next step, which was to have a resolution, “I think you know the results.” It was up to the members of the Council to decide what they wanted to discuss and how they wanted to discuss it. Of course, if they asked the Secretariat to brief them, it would do so. In fact, he had briefed the Council on three different occasions.
The good offices of the Secretary-General had been mandated by the General Assembly and not the Security Council, he continued. The Security Council had its own agenda and could decide what and when it wanted something.
Asked if the United Nations was the right venue for dealing with human rights issues in Myanmar, he said that isolation and sanctions had not worked so far, and the Security Council resolution might not have worked, but that did not mean that Security Council action might not be helpful. The Secretary-General had a role under the mandate from the General Assembly to find ways of building international support for his action, so that the authorities would address the issues he had mentioned. Those efforts should be given a chance, because those countries that had voted against a resolution of the Security Council, while recognizing that there were problems in Myanmar, did not think that the Security Council was the appropriate forum to act on them. They had mentioned the Human Rights Council, in that regard. Under those circumstances, the Secretary-General’s good offices should be used as a means to get the results required.
Asked about the role of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he said that a recent meeting of ASEAN Ministers had agreed in principle to establish a human rights mechanism. That was an important step, because Myanmar had gone along with that, fully aware that once that mechanism was established, it would look at human rights records of ASEAN Member States. He hoped all ASEAN countries would cooperate in the work of such a mechanism.
Asked about the Secretary-General’s answer to Mrs. Bush’s letter regarding Myanmar, he said that the response had been hand-delivered to the White House on 19 June. The Secretary-General supported Mrs. Bush’s efforts to draw attention to the situation in Myanmar and pledged to work with her and others towards the goals of democratization, human rights, cessation of hostilities, humanitarian access and freedom for all political detainees. In a subsequent conversation, Mrs. Bush had asked the Secretary-General to exert pressure on Myanmar, and the interlocutors had pledged to maintain contact.
A correspondent commented said that there appeared to be two Myanmars in the world: one where the human rights situation was atrocious and the one that Mr. Gambari was describing. He wondered if it was Mr. Gambari’s role to be “a chief international apologist for the system” that allowed Myanmar to continue along its line at the moment.
In response, Mr. Gambari said that there was no question of apologies for any regime. He had described precisely what the Secretary-General was doing, what were the limits of his authority, what were the limits of the tools available to him. Within that, it was important to continue the best efforts to bring about concrete results. “How do you bring about change in the attitude of a regime?” he asked in that connection. “You can either change the regime, which is not an option available to us, or achieve change … by allowing international forces, particularly those that have influence on the regime, to bring it to be, and we have decided to take the second option.”
Regarding the economic situation in the country, he said that it was dire, and the decision to increase the price of petroleum had only exacerbated it. In that context, it was important to address the root causes of the present situation. While it was necessary to address the issue of arrests and detentions, it was also important to focus on basic issues of economic management and meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Also important were the problems of fair distribution of the resources available to the country. That was what the UNDP was doing.
The aspect that did not seem to interest the press corps related to the spread of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria, he continued. It was indicative, in that regard, that some of the countries that had been most critical of Myanmar’s human rights record had put together a fund of almost $100 million over the period of 10 years, because they recognized that those diseases had no boundaries and it was the people of the country that were suffering from it. Myanmar authorities’ cooperation on those issues was encouraging, and the United Nations was pushing them to extend the same cooperation to other areas, including the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need. In the absence of “big sticks”, it was important to build on every opportunity.
Friday, August 3, 2007
The CIS and Baltic Press on Russia
The CIS and Baltic Press on Russia
3/ 08/ 2007
Estonia
A number of journalists believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin is planning to make an early comeback. They argue that Russia has deliberately worsened relations with the West in order to facilitate Putin's early return to power after 2008. "The whole political game is revolving around Putin's successor. According to the plan, the latter will not actually be a successor but rather 'acting' president. The plan mainly involves preventing the successor from sitting pretty in the presidential chair. Putin is supposed to leave his post next spring; under the plan, he will be replaced by someone else just for a year or a year and a half. When much-suffering, crisis-ridden Russia is in trouble again, Putin will return as a knight on a white horse to save it. In a nutshell, this is an option for the current Kremlin team's comeback together with Putin." (Parnu Postimees, July 25).
The press is accusing Russia of organizing cyber attacks on Estonian servers. "By supporting cyber criminals, Russia has stooped to the level of the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan because there is little difference between a state allowing suicide bombers or cyber terrorists to be trained on its territory...Even if there is no evidence that Russia is behind the attacks, its actions (or lack thereof) make clear that it supports cyber terrorism. Russia is a good place for the recruitment, training and operation of cyber terrorists. Nobody bothers or punishes them, and they can continue planning future attacks with impunity." (SL Ohtuleht, July 28).
Latvia
The press is critical of new Latvian President Valdis Zatlers, who believes that the Russian-British conflict is a purely bilateral issue. "If conflicts with Russia become purely bilateral issues, we may end up facing it on our own, in which case it will make patently unacceptable demands." (Diena, July 25).
The press is actively discussing Russia's bid to claim the Arctic Ocean and its effort to prove by means of research that it can extend its territorial waters by 1.2 million square kilometers to the north of its coastline and up to the North Pole. This area may contain up to 100 billion tons of energy resources. "The Kremlin's efforts to reach the North Pole...show that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not afraid of irritating the West. Putin wants a strong Russia, and Western dependence on his country's oil and natural gas is part of this strategy." (Diena, July 27). "The North Pole is not the only 'prize' that the reviving Russian Empire is striving for. Moscow also wants to restore its control over part of the Bering Sea basin (with an area of more than 47,000 square kilometers) between Chukotka and Alaska." (Biznes&Baltiya, July 30).
Lithuania
Experts are optimistic about the CIS market and expect it to become markedly more active in the next few months. "The CIS market is still attractive because nervous investors have already left it, and the share of stable local capital will go up this year. This is why there are grounds for hope that the CIS market will be the most attractive of all emerging markets regardless of whether or not there is a global correction...The Russian equity market has a huge potential for growth in the next three to six months. The number of available shares will go down and investors will be less and less worried about political risks; prices for Russian shares are not excessive, with the exception of the energy sector." (Verslo zinios, July 26).
Belarus
Commentators are discussing the shortcomings of President Alexander Lukashenko's economic policy, which has made Belarus directly dependent on Russian loans. They think that Prime Minister Sergei Sidorsky may be made a scapegoat if the talks fall through.
"Lukashenko will never admit that without Russian energy subsidies, his economic model is a failure. In other words, it is the government and Prime Minister Sidorsky that are to blame for the economic crisis and the decline in living standards. For the time being, the Belarusian economy is doing OK - production is growing and wages are on the rise. But Belarusian experts predict that if nothing changes and Russia does not do [Belarus] any favors, a crisis may break out by the end of this year or the beginning of 2008." (Khartiya, July 27).
The press continues discussing the "conspiracy" which is allegedly brewing in Lukashenklo's closest entourage, not without the Kremlin's involvement. "Lukashenko does not trust his old personnel, and they are tired of the constant psychological pressure...They need guarantees in order to get rid of the president when the time is right. No doubt, they are waiting for a signal from important people. They would prefer to get it from Russia, but they will take it from the West as well. All they want is for this signal to be authentic and loud. Everyone liked the Yugoslavian scenario." (Belorussky partisan, July 29).
Ukraine
The media believe that Britain's actions on the Lugovoi case are motivated partly by economic considerations. London is not happy about the excessive zeal of Russian companies on the British market, and it wants to curb Moscow's expansionist plans by discrediting Moscow on the world stage. "London has received an opportunity to show the voters its readiness to go to any lengths for the sake of their security... Russia has turned from a huge but weak country into a tough rival with a wolfish appetite...Moscow's refusal to extradite Lugovoi gives London a very convenient excuse to conduct its propaganda campaign, accusing the Kremlin of refusing to cooperate with the justice system." (Glavred, July 25). "Russia is obviously becoming a mighty and sinister power which wants to play by its own rules." (Obozrevatel, July 26).
Moldova
The press has extensively covered Russia's decision to suspend the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Some analysts are perplexed by the lack of a response from Chisinau to Moscow's decision. "The Kremlin's decision will have a direct effect on Moldova...because there are Russian troops on its territory, which is illegal...Almost all signatories to the CFE treaty have already responded to Putin's decision - some have done so more than once - and the attitude was invariably negative. Even Russia's allies - Belarus and Armenia - do not support Moscow on this issue. It seems like the Republic of Moldova is the only country to remain silent even though its vital interests are at stake. Or maybe it is precisely because its interests are at stake that it is afraid to irritate the Kremlin." (Flux, July 25).
Armenia
The press is closely watching the talks on the status of Kosovo. Experts maintain that Kosovo is bound to be independent and that this decision will become a precedent for as-yet-unrecognized republics in the former Soviet Union. "The United States continues declaring that Kosovo will be given independence no matter what. But who will answer the question of how Kosovo can become independent without the UN's consent? Trying to avoid the resolution of the Kosovo issue at the UN Security Council, where Russia has a veto, the United States has started acting just as it did before the start of the Iraqi military campaign. In other words, in order to circumvent the United Nations, the United States requires the support of its European partners. But unlike the U.S., its partners in Europe are opposed to unilaterally granting Kosovo independence...Tellingly, Kosovo's leaders are planning to declare independence on November 28 - Albania's Independence Day. This may introduce the principle of 'one nation-two states', which could have wide-ranging implications for the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh... Realizing that the United States and Russia will not find a compromise on Kosovo, the world community has to look for unconventional decisions. But no matter what decision the world makes, in perspective it is bound to create a precedent." (Hayots Ashkhar, July 26).
Georgia
The Georgian media have lashed out at UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for his report on the situation in Abkhazia. Tbilisi chalks up his objectionable assessments to the Kremlin's intrigues and accuses the United Nations of "dancing to Russia's tune."
"Statements by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon confirm that international organizations - the United Nations, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the Council of Europe ... are actually the puppets of the powers that be and do not have any influence on their own." (Sakartvelos Respublica, July 26). "The UN secretary-general's gesture represents a concession to Russia and shows that it partially shares its position. Time and again, Russia exerts a lot of pressure on the United Nations." (Rezonansi, July 25).
The Georgian media are highly critical of Russian peacekeepers. The press is urging the authorities to take tough measures and to prepare for the inevitable provocations which Moscow will carry out in the peacekeeper-controlled parts of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. "We must be ready for provocations, all the more so when we are faced with such an adversary as Russia...The situation is bound to become worse, and it will happen in winter because the elections will be closer...The Georgian armed forces and security agencies have the ability to reply to an armed provocation with a counter-provocation and to capture or destroy the bulk of the criminals...If we provide an adequate, tough and professional response, the Russian authorities will retreat..." (Ahali Taoba, July 25).
Azerbaijan
The opposition press has been paying a lot of attention to the visit to the United States by religious leaders from three of Russia's North Caucasian republics: Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria.
"The U.S. president's interest in the religious leaders from the North Caucasus has worried the Kremlin." (Yeni Musavat, July 26). "Putin and his soul mates from among the Russian 'Orthodox Chekists' have reason to be nervous because the imams' trip to the U.S. is the first sign of Washington's intention to tap the Muslim regions of Russia in earnest. Moscow understands quite well how volatile the region is." (Echo, July 26).
Kazakhstan
Analysts maintain that Kazakhstan's nuclear cooperation with the United States will allow Astana already in 2014 to replace its uranium exports (including those to Russia) with finished products with a high added value. Now that Astana has bought shares in America's Westinghouse company, Russia may lose lucrative contracts for the construction of power plants in the CIS. "If Westinghouse combines its commercial activities with political support from the White House, Astana's multi-directional policy in the nuclear field will become one more test for the relations between the Russian and Kazakh leaders. Moreover, Russia's irritation with the American direction of Kazakh energy cooperation may be just as great as its disappointment with Kazakhstan's participation in oil and gas projects bypassing Russian territory." (Delovaya nedelya, July 27).
Experts believe that the project to build a transcontinental railroad and the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline is not likely to be carried out in the near future because China's geopolitical goals are at variance with Russia's objectives. "Analysts think that this project is of very little interest to Russia. Its big neighbor, Kazakhstan, has the Trans-Siberian Railway, which is running quite well. For all the benefits of Sino-Russian relations, why would Russia want an overly active partner in its Central Asian underbelly? Needless to say, Moscow will not torpedo the transportation project right away in order not to spoil its good relations with Beijing, but it would be premature to expect it to take an active part in it." (Liter.kz, July 27).
Uzbekistan
The press is discussing measures to counter the mounting threat of cyber terrorism. The very low cost of cyber weapons makes them extremely dangerous for technologically advanced nations. Experts maintain that the CIS, which has unified legal standards, should also have a common strategy for combating cyber terrorism. "At present, the interests of all CIS nations have been compromised by the new arc of terrorist activity, running from the Balkans to the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan. In effect, practically all CIS countries have already been drawn into the orbit of cyber terrorist wars...Using Internet resources, the terrorists are not only exchanging information and recruiting new members, but also conducting active propaganda campaigns. The CIS nations should therefore work out adequate and effective strategic and tactical measures to fight cyber terrorism." (Vesti.uz, July 30).
Kyrgyzstan
On the eve of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's summit this month, the media are analyzing the body's role in the modern world. Analysts believe that the Shanghai alliance may have considerable influence on the balance of geopolitical interests in Central Asia. Moreover, it is likely to grow stronger as the West loses its positions in the region. Analysts note that the success of this scenario will largely depend on Russia's activity in the SCO.
The press is writing that Moscow will have to fight with Beijing in the battle for leadership of the SCO. The media recommend that the Kremlin should concentrate on the risks emanating from China rather than U.S. geopolitical goals in Central Asia. "Russia has exploited Washington's mistakes. By trying to 'advance democracy' in some countries, the United States has reduced its influence to naught by making it clear that its actions can produce nothing but chaos...The Sino-Russian effort to lay special emphasis on the SCO's military wing is gradually shaping a new alliance between the two major Eurasian powers...Any confrontations between them may have an adverse effect on the situation in Central Asia...There are a number of disagreements between Russia and China over SCO economic integration...If Central Asian countries decide that China is more willing to help them with their problems, they will not want to integrate with Moscow." (Obshchestvenny reiting, July 25).
Turkmenistan
Analysts continue to discuss Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov's visit to China, which produced an agreement on the construction of a joint pipeline. They are emphasizing Beijing's apprehensions about Gazprom's dominance on the Turkmen energy market and the link between this agreement and a similar project involving China and Russia that the latter has now suspended. "The recent agreement between Ashkhabad and Moscow to lay the Caspian gas pipeline caused concern in China. Turkmenistan's commitments to step up gas supplies to Russia in 2009 also worry China. Meanwhile, Ashkhabad is convinced that the Russian contract will not affect its gas obligations to third countries. Beijing's flexibility was facilitated by [Moscow's] decision to suspend last year's Sino-Russian memorandum of intention to build a pipeline from Kovykta to China. Today, Russia's priority is to build the Caspian gas pipeline and the Nord Stream [linking Russia and the European Union]. China should therefore not worry about competing for Turkmen fuel." (Gundogar, July 27).
Tajikistan
The press doubts that Russia can guarantee the safety of labor migrants from Central Asia and accuses the Russian media of stirring up hostility towards Tajiks. "The migration problem encompasses many other problems that need to be solved. The heads of Russia and Tajikistan have discussed this issue many times and even reached a special agreement. The document was signed, and a couple of days later the media reported that a group of Russian teenagers had killed a Tajik. Russia itself reacts with indignation [when its nationals in other countries are discriminated against]. It sends the world community into a flutter. We, on the other hand, tolerate this outrage and don't know what to do. Russia has not only signed agreements on labor migrants with Tajikistan, but also with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. But the situation of migrant workers has not improved." (Nigokh, July 26).
"Our compatriots will not live peacefully in Russia until the Russian media stop referring to Tajiks as animals, drug dealers and beggars, until the word 'Tajik' is no longer a synonym for something filthy and hostile...Russian TV viewers receive the message 'A Tajik is a slave, a creep, you can step on him like a on cockroach, that would be OK.'" (Fakty i Kommentarii, July 26).
RIA Novosti is not responsible for the content of outside sources.
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070803/70317193.html
3/ 08/ 2007
Estonia
A number of journalists believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin is planning to make an early comeback. They argue that Russia has deliberately worsened relations with the West in order to facilitate Putin's early return to power after 2008. "The whole political game is revolving around Putin's successor. According to the plan, the latter will not actually be a successor but rather 'acting' president. The plan mainly involves preventing the successor from sitting pretty in the presidential chair. Putin is supposed to leave his post next spring; under the plan, he will be replaced by someone else just for a year or a year and a half. When much-suffering, crisis-ridden Russia is in trouble again, Putin will return as a knight on a white horse to save it. In a nutshell, this is an option for the current Kremlin team's comeback together with Putin." (Parnu Postimees, July 25).
The press is accusing Russia of organizing cyber attacks on Estonian servers. "By supporting cyber criminals, Russia has stooped to the level of the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan because there is little difference between a state allowing suicide bombers or cyber terrorists to be trained on its territory...Even if there is no evidence that Russia is behind the attacks, its actions (or lack thereof) make clear that it supports cyber terrorism. Russia is a good place for the recruitment, training and operation of cyber terrorists. Nobody bothers or punishes them, and they can continue planning future attacks with impunity." (SL Ohtuleht, July 28).
Latvia
The press is critical of new Latvian President Valdis Zatlers, who believes that the Russian-British conflict is a purely bilateral issue. "If conflicts with Russia become purely bilateral issues, we may end up facing it on our own, in which case it will make patently unacceptable demands." (Diena, July 25).
The press is actively discussing Russia's bid to claim the Arctic Ocean and its effort to prove by means of research that it can extend its territorial waters by 1.2 million square kilometers to the north of its coastline and up to the North Pole. This area may contain up to 100 billion tons of energy resources. "The Kremlin's efforts to reach the North Pole...show that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not afraid of irritating the West. Putin wants a strong Russia, and Western dependence on his country's oil and natural gas is part of this strategy." (Diena, July 27). "The North Pole is not the only 'prize' that the reviving Russian Empire is striving for. Moscow also wants to restore its control over part of the Bering Sea basin (with an area of more than 47,000 square kilometers) between Chukotka and Alaska." (Biznes&Baltiya, July 30).
Lithuania
Experts are optimistic about the CIS market and expect it to become markedly more active in the next few months. "The CIS market is still attractive because nervous investors have already left it, and the share of stable local capital will go up this year. This is why there are grounds for hope that the CIS market will be the most attractive of all emerging markets regardless of whether or not there is a global correction...The Russian equity market has a huge potential for growth in the next three to six months. The number of available shares will go down and investors will be less and less worried about political risks; prices for Russian shares are not excessive, with the exception of the energy sector." (Verslo zinios, July 26).
Belarus
Commentators are discussing the shortcomings of President Alexander Lukashenko's economic policy, which has made Belarus directly dependent on Russian loans. They think that Prime Minister Sergei Sidorsky may be made a scapegoat if the talks fall through.
"Lukashenko will never admit that without Russian energy subsidies, his economic model is a failure. In other words, it is the government and Prime Minister Sidorsky that are to blame for the economic crisis and the decline in living standards. For the time being, the Belarusian economy is doing OK - production is growing and wages are on the rise. But Belarusian experts predict that if nothing changes and Russia does not do [Belarus] any favors, a crisis may break out by the end of this year or the beginning of 2008." (Khartiya, July 27).
The press continues discussing the "conspiracy" which is allegedly brewing in Lukashenklo's closest entourage, not without the Kremlin's involvement. "Lukashenko does not trust his old personnel, and they are tired of the constant psychological pressure...They need guarantees in order to get rid of the president when the time is right. No doubt, they are waiting for a signal from important people. They would prefer to get it from Russia, but they will take it from the West as well. All they want is for this signal to be authentic and loud. Everyone liked the Yugoslavian scenario." (Belorussky partisan, July 29).
Ukraine
The media believe that Britain's actions on the Lugovoi case are motivated partly by economic considerations. London is not happy about the excessive zeal of Russian companies on the British market, and it wants to curb Moscow's expansionist plans by discrediting Moscow on the world stage. "London has received an opportunity to show the voters its readiness to go to any lengths for the sake of their security... Russia has turned from a huge but weak country into a tough rival with a wolfish appetite...Moscow's refusal to extradite Lugovoi gives London a very convenient excuse to conduct its propaganda campaign, accusing the Kremlin of refusing to cooperate with the justice system." (Glavred, July 25). "Russia is obviously becoming a mighty and sinister power which wants to play by its own rules." (Obozrevatel, July 26).
Moldova
The press has extensively covered Russia's decision to suspend the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Some analysts are perplexed by the lack of a response from Chisinau to Moscow's decision. "The Kremlin's decision will have a direct effect on Moldova...because there are Russian troops on its territory, which is illegal...Almost all signatories to the CFE treaty have already responded to Putin's decision - some have done so more than once - and the attitude was invariably negative. Even Russia's allies - Belarus and Armenia - do not support Moscow on this issue. It seems like the Republic of Moldova is the only country to remain silent even though its vital interests are at stake. Or maybe it is precisely because its interests are at stake that it is afraid to irritate the Kremlin." (Flux, July 25).
Armenia
The press is closely watching the talks on the status of Kosovo. Experts maintain that Kosovo is bound to be independent and that this decision will become a precedent for as-yet-unrecognized republics in the former Soviet Union. "The United States continues declaring that Kosovo will be given independence no matter what. But who will answer the question of how Kosovo can become independent without the UN's consent? Trying to avoid the resolution of the Kosovo issue at the UN Security Council, where Russia has a veto, the United States has started acting just as it did before the start of the Iraqi military campaign. In other words, in order to circumvent the United Nations, the United States requires the support of its European partners. But unlike the U.S., its partners in Europe are opposed to unilaterally granting Kosovo independence...Tellingly, Kosovo's leaders are planning to declare independence on November 28 - Albania's Independence Day. This may introduce the principle of 'one nation-two states', which could have wide-ranging implications for the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh... Realizing that the United States and Russia will not find a compromise on Kosovo, the world community has to look for unconventional decisions. But no matter what decision the world makes, in perspective it is bound to create a precedent." (Hayots Ashkhar, July 26).
Georgia
The Georgian media have lashed out at UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for his report on the situation in Abkhazia. Tbilisi chalks up his objectionable assessments to the Kremlin's intrigues and accuses the United Nations of "dancing to Russia's tune."
"Statements by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon confirm that international organizations - the United Nations, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the Council of Europe ... are actually the puppets of the powers that be and do not have any influence on their own." (Sakartvelos Respublica, July 26). "The UN secretary-general's gesture represents a concession to Russia and shows that it partially shares its position. Time and again, Russia exerts a lot of pressure on the United Nations." (Rezonansi, July 25).
The Georgian media are highly critical of Russian peacekeepers. The press is urging the authorities to take tough measures and to prepare for the inevitable provocations which Moscow will carry out in the peacekeeper-controlled parts of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. "We must be ready for provocations, all the more so when we are faced with such an adversary as Russia...The situation is bound to become worse, and it will happen in winter because the elections will be closer...The Georgian armed forces and security agencies have the ability to reply to an armed provocation with a counter-provocation and to capture or destroy the bulk of the criminals...If we provide an adequate, tough and professional response, the Russian authorities will retreat..." (Ahali Taoba, July 25).
Azerbaijan
The opposition press has been paying a lot of attention to the visit to the United States by religious leaders from three of Russia's North Caucasian republics: Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria.
"The U.S. president's interest in the religious leaders from the North Caucasus has worried the Kremlin." (Yeni Musavat, July 26). "Putin and his soul mates from among the Russian 'Orthodox Chekists' have reason to be nervous because the imams' trip to the U.S. is the first sign of Washington's intention to tap the Muslim regions of Russia in earnest. Moscow understands quite well how volatile the region is." (Echo, July 26).
Kazakhstan
Analysts maintain that Kazakhstan's nuclear cooperation with the United States will allow Astana already in 2014 to replace its uranium exports (including those to Russia) with finished products with a high added value. Now that Astana has bought shares in America's Westinghouse company, Russia may lose lucrative contracts for the construction of power plants in the CIS. "If Westinghouse combines its commercial activities with political support from the White House, Astana's multi-directional policy in the nuclear field will become one more test for the relations between the Russian and Kazakh leaders. Moreover, Russia's irritation with the American direction of Kazakh energy cooperation may be just as great as its disappointment with Kazakhstan's participation in oil and gas projects bypassing Russian territory." (Delovaya nedelya, July 27).
Experts believe that the project to build a transcontinental railroad and the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline is not likely to be carried out in the near future because China's geopolitical goals are at variance with Russia's objectives. "Analysts think that this project is of very little interest to Russia. Its big neighbor, Kazakhstan, has the Trans-Siberian Railway, which is running quite well. For all the benefits of Sino-Russian relations, why would Russia want an overly active partner in its Central Asian underbelly? Needless to say, Moscow will not torpedo the transportation project right away in order not to spoil its good relations with Beijing, but it would be premature to expect it to take an active part in it." (Liter.kz, July 27).
Uzbekistan
The press is discussing measures to counter the mounting threat of cyber terrorism. The very low cost of cyber weapons makes them extremely dangerous for technologically advanced nations. Experts maintain that the CIS, which has unified legal standards, should also have a common strategy for combating cyber terrorism. "At present, the interests of all CIS nations have been compromised by the new arc of terrorist activity, running from the Balkans to the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan. In effect, practically all CIS countries have already been drawn into the orbit of cyber terrorist wars...Using Internet resources, the terrorists are not only exchanging information and recruiting new members, but also conducting active propaganda campaigns. The CIS nations should therefore work out adequate and effective strategic and tactical measures to fight cyber terrorism." (Vesti.uz, July 30).
Kyrgyzstan
On the eve of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's summit this month, the media are analyzing the body's role in the modern world. Analysts believe that the Shanghai alliance may have considerable influence on the balance of geopolitical interests in Central Asia. Moreover, it is likely to grow stronger as the West loses its positions in the region. Analysts note that the success of this scenario will largely depend on Russia's activity in the SCO.
The press is writing that Moscow will have to fight with Beijing in the battle for leadership of the SCO. The media recommend that the Kremlin should concentrate on the risks emanating from China rather than U.S. geopolitical goals in Central Asia. "Russia has exploited Washington's mistakes. By trying to 'advance democracy' in some countries, the United States has reduced its influence to naught by making it clear that its actions can produce nothing but chaos...The Sino-Russian effort to lay special emphasis on the SCO's military wing is gradually shaping a new alliance between the two major Eurasian powers...Any confrontations between them may have an adverse effect on the situation in Central Asia...There are a number of disagreements between Russia and China over SCO economic integration...If Central Asian countries decide that China is more willing to help them with their problems, they will not want to integrate with Moscow." (Obshchestvenny reiting, July 25).
Turkmenistan
Analysts continue to discuss Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov's visit to China, which produced an agreement on the construction of a joint pipeline. They are emphasizing Beijing's apprehensions about Gazprom's dominance on the Turkmen energy market and the link between this agreement and a similar project involving China and Russia that the latter has now suspended. "The recent agreement between Ashkhabad and Moscow to lay the Caspian gas pipeline caused concern in China. Turkmenistan's commitments to step up gas supplies to Russia in 2009 also worry China. Meanwhile, Ashkhabad is convinced that the Russian contract will not affect its gas obligations to third countries. Beijing's flexibility was facilitated by [Moscow's] decision to suspend last year's Sino-Russian memorandum of intention to build a pipeline from Kovykta to China. Today, Russia's priority is to build the Caspian gas pipeline and the Nord Stream [linking Russia and the European Union]. China should therefore not worry about competing for Turkmen fuel." (Gundogar, July 27).
Tajikistan
The press doubts that Russia can guarantee the safety of labor migrants from Central Asia and accuses the Russian media of stirring up hostility towards Tajiks. "The migration problem encompasses many other problems that need to be solved. The heads of Russia and Tajikistan have discussed this issue many times and even reached a special agreement. The document was signed, and a couple of days later the media reported that a group of Russian teenagers had killed a Tajik. Russia itself reacts with indignation [when its nationals in other countries are discriminated against]. It sends the world community into a flutter. We, on the other hand, tolerate this outrage and don't know what to do. Russia has not only signed agreements on labor migrants with Tajikistan, but also with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. But the situation of migrant workers has not improved." (Nigokh, July 26).
"Our compatriots will not live peacefully in Russia until the Russian media stop referring to Tajiks as animals, drug dealers and beggars, until the word 'Tajik' is no longer a synonym for something filthy and hostile...Russian TV viewers receive the message 'A Tajik is a slave, a creep, you can step on him like a on cockroach, that would be OK.'" (Fakty i Kommentarii, July 26).
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http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070803/70317193.html
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